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Are policy failures mobile? An investigation of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
Program in the State of Victoria, Australia 
 
Abstract 
This paper is about a case of policy failure and negative lesson drawing, namely the 
implementation of a mandatory smart metering program - the Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI) Program - in the State of Victoria, Australia, in the period 2009-13. The 
paper explores the framing of policy failure, and the ways in which failed polices might be 
mobile.  The AMI Program provides an important empirical counterbalance to existing 
scholarship on policy learning, transfer and mobility, which is for the most part about 
positive best practice case studies, emulation, and the travelling of ‘fast’ and (by implication) 
successful policy. There is evidence that the Victorian AMI Program circulated domestically 
within Australia and was influential in policy decision making, but that its international 
mobility was limited. The case is used to explore what gets left behind - or is immobile - in 
the telling of policy stories about failure. Science and Technology Studies scholarship on the 
inherent fragility of sociotechnical networks is drawn upon to consider how the concept of 
assemblage - a popular conceptual lens within policy mobility scholarship - might be applied 
to better understand instances of policy failure.  
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1.Introduction 
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This paper is about the implementation of a policy that did not proceed as expected, and came 
to be labelled a policy failure, namely the Australian State of Victoria’s Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI) Program (2009-13) (hereafter ‘the AMI Program’).   The paper explores 
the learning that took place from the AMI Program and in particular how and why it 
travelled, with what effect. The politics of framing something as a policy failure is also 
explored. There is little evidence of international lesson drawing from the AMI Program, 
however, it did have influence domestically: the AMI Program contributed to a change of 
policy in the rest of Australia. The National Electricity Market (NEM) in Australia had plans 
to implement the same mandatory advanced (or ‘smart’) metering programme as Victoria, but 
in 2012 NEM policy shifted instead towards a voluntary, market-led approach for the 
implementation of smart meters, and the Victorian AMI Program was invoked to justify this 
change in policy (AEMC 2012). Drawing on this empirical case, the paper evaluates whether 
policy failures circulate and move in similar ways to best practice successful policies, for 
there is ambiguity in existing scholarship, with a number of authors implicitly equating 
policy failure with immobility (McCann 2008, McCann and Ward 2015).  Further, analysis 
builds on existing Science and Technology Studies (STS) and urban studies influences within 
policy mobility scholarship to explore sociotechnical issues pertinent to the movement of 
policy failures, through the notion of assemblage (Allen and Cochrane 2007, Hardie and 
Mackenzie 2007). It is suggested that STS ideas about the inherent fragility of sociotechnical 
networks or assemblages, and their tendency to unravel, can be usefully applied to better 
understand policy failures, including thinking about what gets left behind - or is immobile - 
in policy stories about failure. 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the amount of policy transfer and diffusion taking place - the 
international mobility of policy - has increased in recent decades (Evans and Davies 1999, 
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McCann 2011, McCann and Ward 2012, Stone 2012). This is attributed to globalisation and 
improved communications and travel, facilitating the spread of ‘fast policy’ (Peck and 
Theodore 2015) and associated practices such as ‘policy tourism’ (Hudson and Bo-Yung 
2014).  A growing emphasis on evidence-based policy making is also identified as a factor 
(González 2011). The idea of policy transfer - whilst an inherently geographical one, about 
the movement of policy from one place to another - stems originally from political science, 
where policy transfer is defined simply as “… the process by which actors borrow policies 
developed in one setting to develop programs and policies within another.” (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 1996: 357).  Policy transfer is often used as an overarching ‘umbrella term’ that 
encompasses lesson drawing, diffusion and policy learning (Evans and Davies 1999), 
although this positioning of policy learning as a subset of transfer has rightly been criticised 
(Bulkeley 2006).  In this paper, however, for reasons of brevity I concentrate on scholarship 
about the movement of policy, rather than wider literatures on policy learning. 
 
Scholarship on policy transfer has grown considerably since early political science 
contributions (Walker 1969, Rose 1991, Bennett and Howlett 1992, Dolowitz and Marsh 
1996, 2000).  Stone (2012), for example, recently identified over eight hundred papers on the 
topic. Policy transfer has also in the process become a significantly more interdisciplinary 
topic of research (Benson and Jordan 2011, McCann and Ward 2012). A ‘new wave’ of 
scholarship - termed policy mobility - has been led principally by geographers and urban 
studies scholars.  It has challenged the political science conceptualisation of policy transfer 
on a number of grounds, including the portrayal of policy transfer as a rational process, and 
an overemphasis on the role of states and government-to-government transfer (Ward 2006, 
Peck and Theodore 2010, McCann 2011, Peck 2011, Clarke 2012, Prince 2012).  Valuable 
ideas and concepts from economic geography, urban studies and STS have been introduced 
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including neoliberalism, relational geographies, governmentality and assemblage, along with 
a host of new terms including policy mobility, translation and mutation.  
 
The idea of mutation of policies counters the rather static portrayal of policy transfer and 
diffusion within political science, with policies characterised as moving largely unaltered 
from one nation-state to another, driven by a rational search for policy solutions. Such an 
unproblematic, linear characterisation has been subject to critique on a number of grounds 
(Bulkeley 2006), with McCann and other policy mobility scholars arguing that “Policies, 
models, and ideas are not moved around like gifts at a birthday party or like jars on shelves, 
where the mobilization does not change the character and content of the mobilized objects.” 
(McCann 2011: 111). Relatedly, policy mobility scholars have been considerably more 
attentive to precisely what constitutes policies – their sociotechnical assemblage, defined in 
the context of policy mobility as “… a purposive gathering of people, institutional capacities, 
expertise, models, techniques and technologies, political sustenance… from local sources 
and, crucially, from elsewhere.” (McCann 2011: 144). The intention is to acknowledge both 
the wider range of actors (human and non-human) that constitute policy making, as well as 
the broader array of sites in which policies are formulated and circulated.  A key objective in 
this regard has been a focus on cities as important nodes in international policy circuits 
(McCann 2011, McCann and Ward 2011, Jacobs 2012). 
 
Much has been written on the emergence of policy mobility and its distinctiveness to political 
science work on policy transfer (for overviews see Benson and Jordan 2011, McCann and 
Ward 2012, Stone 2012).  It is not my intention to provide a comprehensive analysis of this 
debate here, but rather to focus on policy mobility and policy transfer scholars’ recognition 
of, and attentiveness to, the issue of policy failure. For, despite the upswell of activity and 
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new interdisciplinary engagement in policy transfer scholarship, there remains - as others 
have noted (Clarke 2012, Jacobs 2012, Webber 2015) - a problem at its empirical core, 
namely a preponderance of successful best practice case studies. In other words, policy 
transfer and mobility research is overwhelmingly about policies that do work and are 
‘present’ - publically promoted and discussed as successes - ranging from urban regeneration 
in Bilbao and Barcelona (González 2011), to sustainability in Vancouver (McCann 2008).  
Scholarship is in effect therefore missing a large part of the empirical picture. Instances of 
non-transfer because of policy failure, as well as explorations of how and why negative 
policy lessons are framed as such, and circulate as examples of failure, are issues that have 
been empirically neglected (for a notable exceptions see Robertson 1991, Müller 2015, 
Webber 2015). 
 
Analysis is therefore based on primary empirical investigation undertaken during 2015 of a 
policy in the State of Victoria, Australia, which is widely regarded as a policy failure, and 
includes: twenty-five expert interviews across Australian government (state and federal), 
utility and metering companies, industry bodies, nongovernmental and standards 
organisations; attendance at several specialist meetings and workshops; and an extensive 
policy literature review of Australian and international smart metering and smart grid 
documents and websites.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: first, a brief background on the development of smart 
metering policy in Australia and the State of Victoria is provided; second, a review of policy 
transfer and policy mobility scholarship considers how policy failure has been conceptualised 
to date and evaluates the potential for STS-grounded theories such as assemblage to provide a 
means to better understand policy failure; third, key findings from the empirical case of the 
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AMI Program are explored including how it was framed as a policy failure, and its domestic 
and (limited) international mobility. Fourth, in conclusion, these findings are summarised and 
their implications discussed. 
 
2.Background – smart electricity metering in Australia 
Smart meters are a new type of digital communications-enabled electricity meter that produce 
detailed, fine-grained data on energy use.  This data can be transmitted to electronic devices 
within the home or business that display consumption in real-time.  Smart meters can be used 
to measure water and gas, but it is electricity meters that are most common, and that are the 
focus of this paper. Smart meters are also called ‘advanced meters’, as in the case of Victoria.  
Advanced or smart meters are subtly different to interval meters - a forerunner of smart 
meters with similar functionality but lacking two-way communications - and distinctly 
different from traditional ‘accumulation’ or ‘spinning disc’ meters, which measure 
consumption using a physical method: a rotating disc. 
 
Although smart metering policy in Australia has largely been developed at a national, federal 
level through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Energy Council and the 
organisations governing the National Electricity Market (NEM), under the Australian federal 
system of government the individual states and territories have considerable discretion and 
their own policy-making powers.   And so it is that the State of Victoria was pursuing its own 
mandatory smart metering installation program – the AMI – in advance of a 2007 COAG 
agreement on a national approach. The Victorian AMI Program was given state government 
approval in 2006 and commenced in 2009, in anticipation at the time of the rest of the NEM 
following suit.  Discussions around changes to electricity metering in Victoria actually started 
several years before: there was agreement in 2004 on a program to replace traditional meters 
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with interval meters on a gradual (non-mandatory) basis (ESC 2004). But, after a number of 
studies and further consideration (see CRA International and Impaq 2005), it was decided to 
modify the interval metering programme to a ‘smart’ or advanced metering programme, i.e. 
to install ‘next generation’ meters incorporating two-way communications, and to do this 
more quickly, with a mandatory ‘accelerated roll-out’ (DPI 2007: 7).  The reasons given by 
the Victorian Government for adopting such an approach were to enhance retail competition 
and provide better functionality from the meters through employing an efficient and timely 
installation method (DPI 2007). 
 
In the period 2009 to 2013 2.8 million advanced meters were installed on this basis in 93% of 
homes and small businesses across Victoria (VAGO 2015). This involved removing the old 
‘spinning disc’ meter in each property and replacing it with a digital ‘advanced’ meter. The 
Program was managed by the distribution and transmission utilities (i.e. those responsible for 
the electricity ‘poles and wires’), and overseen by government.  Customers were charged 
directly for the new meters, with Victorian households paying on average $760 extra on their 
bills because of additional metering charges in the period 2010-2015 (VAGO, 2015: 29). It 
was anticipated that customers would make equivalent or larger savings through reduction in 
bills because the meters allow more detailed feedback on electricity use, and facilitate the 
introduction of new flexible pricing tariffs allowing cheaper consumption at particular times 
of day (‘time of use’ tariffs).  The AMI Program officially finished at the end of 2013, and a 
rebate was offered to customers if smart meter installation had still not been attempted at 
their property by the end of June 2014 (VAGO 2015: 29). 
 
It was not long after the start of the AMI Program implementation in 2009 that problems 
started to emerge.  Tensions centred mostly around costs, as the AMI Program was structured 
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in such a way that any financial risks were borne by customers rather than the utilities or 
government; moreover, additional costs were ascribed to all households from January 2010, 
regardless of whether or not they already had a new meter installed (VAGO 2015). Further, 
there were a number of broader governance concerns raised about the AMI Program, 
including: the degree of public sector oversight, the exclusion of retailers1 from decision 
making, as well as access to smart meter data, and data privacy issues (see Deloitte 2011: 9, 
VAGO 2015: ix).  Public protests and campaign groups emerged such as Stop Smart Meters 
Australia and a dedicated anti-AMI Program political party People Power Victoria, with 
central campaigning issues including negative health effects because of radiofrequency 
emissions from wireless digital meters, rising bills, and privacy concerns (People Power 
Victoria 2015, SSMA 2015). 
 
Thus, despite initial optimism around the State of Victoria providing a positive ‘best practice’ 
demonstration of a new electricity metering policy for the rest of Australia to follow (see for 
example NSMP 2008: 4, Marchment Hill Consulting 2009), the AMI Program emerged 
instead as a policy failure, such that from 2013 onwards there was a flurry of Australian 
federal and state government documents explicitly stating that the AMI Program would not 
be replicated elsewhere (Queensland Department of Energy and Water Supply 2013, NSW 
Minister for Resources and Energy 2014, Department of State Growth 2015). Thus the policy 
failure of the AMI contributed to a change of policy at the national level: Australia’s smart 
metering policy changed quite significantly in the period 2013-15, with a much less stringent 
and more open-ended policy of voluntary, competitive or ‘market-led’ smart metering 
installation process introduced in the NEM (AEMC 2012, Department of Industry and 
Science 2015).  In essence, the new policy means there is no longer an obligation for smart 
                                                        
1 A decision was taken early on by the Victorian state government for the AMI to be implemented by the electricity 
distribution companies (the companies who run the electricity networks, of which there are five in Victoria), with oversight 
by the then State Department of Infrastructure.   
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meters to be installed (AEMC 2015), and indeed several organisations have questioned 
whether there will be any significant customer uptake (see for example TasNetworks 2015).  
 
3. Theorising policy failure 
As noted in introduction, there is an acknowledged shortage of research on the movement of 
policy that considers negative lesson drawing, learning and policy failure (Jacobs 2012, 
McCann and Ward 2015, Webber 2015).  In this review of existing scholarship the focus is 
firstly on the small body of work that has been developed on the topic, across political 
science (policy transfer), and geography and urban studies (policy mobility). Second, STS 
concepts relating to the fragility of networks and their breakdown are evaluated for the 
insights they might provide for cases of policy failure. In particular, there is judged to be 
potential for using the concept of assemblage to conceptualise not just the coherence of 
assemblages in cases of policy success, but also their fragmentation in cases of policy failure. 
 
Negative lesson drawing and policy failure 
In early political science work on policy transfer, negative lesson drawing and learning from 
policy failure is in most cases viewed as an oddity: highly distinct from positive, best practice 
learning and transfer and the travelling of policy solutions, and mostly ignored.  Crucially, 
therefore, negative lesson drawing is not seen for the most part as on a continuum of policy 
transfer processes, but rather something inherently different - an outlier. For instance, 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 349, emphasis added) - in answer to the question ‘what is 
transferred?’ in their review of policy transfer - identify  “… seven objects of transfer: policy 
goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; 
ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and negative lessons.”  It is not clear why negative 
lessons are listed separately here, and it wrongly implies that they are not related to policy 
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goals, ideas or instruments. In a similar vein, Rose’s (1991: 22) description of different ways 
of drawing a lesson - copying, emulation, hybridization, synthesis, and inspiration - leaves 
little room for positioning policy failures, for it is hard to imagine situations where one might 
emulate, or draw inspiration from, failed policies. Illical and Harrison (2007: 391, emphasis 
added) reach a similar conclusion about the core overall term ‘policy transfer’: 
 
"Although Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) allow that “policy transfer” may be positive or 
negative, the everyday use of the term transfer implies a positive lesson.” 
 
This ‘bracketing off’ of policy failure has, however, been attended to more recently by a 
number of scholars. From within political science, the concepts of policy transfer and 
learning have embraced policy failure in a more holistic way, positioning it as part of a 
continuum with policy success (Bovens and t’Hart 1996, Marsh and McConnell 2010, 
Howlett 2012).  The thrust of analysis in political science scholarship remains, however, 
focused on learning within government in the policy’s place of origin, rather than whether 
and/or how these policy failures might travel further afield. Indeed, the inference is simply 
that policy failures simply do not move beyond the particular locality in which they were first 
implemented: they remain geographically contained where they were implemented. There, 
are, however, some important exceptions. The paper by Illical and Harrison (2007) provides a 
rare, detailed long-term study case of negative learning about the transfer of endangered 
species policy between the US and Canada. The US implemented the Endangered Species 
Act in 1973 and Canada learnt from some of the things that did not go well and a long time 
later - in 2002 - implemented its own version of the policy. A core finding of this study is the 
wider context that shaped Canadian policy, as the authors explain: 
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“The case of endangered species policy in the US and Canada thus offers not only a clear 
example of the impact of negative lesson-drawing, but also suggests the importance of the 
interaction of lesson-drawing, interests, and institutions…. the negative lessons of the US 
Endangered Species Act were readily incorporated because their “fit” with the institutional 
setting and prevailing balance of interests.” (Illical and Harrison 2007: 390, emphasis 
added). 
 
This finding echoes early analysis by Robertson (1991) in his research on decision making 
across several policy sectors in the US including mandatory plant closures, labour market and 
income support.  Robertson provides an interesting account of how positive and negative 
lesson drawing from elsewhere is more or less likely to occur at different stages of the policy 
process: with positive lesson drawing tending to take place at the early agenda-setting stage, 
and negative lesson drawing during intense decision-making on implementation. Robertson 
makes a strong argument for attending to the politics of policy transfer, noting how "Policy 
lessons from abroad often are put forward as politically neutral truths. Beneath this 
superficial impartiality, political adversaries… are using such lessons as political weapons." 
(Robertson 1991: 55). 
 
Such attentiveness to the social construction of policy successes and failures and the wider 
context in which policies flow are core interests of a burgeoning ‘new wave’ of 
interdisciplinary scholarship on policy transfer - policy mobility - led principally by 
geographers and urban studies scholars.  Jamie Peck, a key policy mobility scholar, for 
example reflects how: 
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“…the field of policy transfer…  is saturated by power relations. These intensely contested 
and deeply constitutive contexts… shape what is seen, and what counts, in terms of policy 
innovations, preferred models, and best practices. They also frame those narratives of ‘policy 
failure’ that establish the premises and preconditions for policy experimentation, and which 
variously animate and constrain the search for new institutional fixes." (Peck 2011: 791); 
 
and McCann and Ward (2015: 1) explicitly identify success and failure as part of a 
continuum, noting how: 
“Neither success nor failure is absolute. One does not make sense without the other. Rather, 
success and failure are relationally constituted in politics and in policy-making. Studies of 
urban policy mobilities should, then, reflect critically on approaches to success/failure and 
their relational constitution even as they simultaneously study the effects of their empirical 
separation and reification in policy-making.” 
Jacobs (2012) builds on McCann and the work of other policy mobility scholars to likewise 
advocate approaches that consider “Sites of failure, absence and mutation [as] significant 
empirical instances of differentiation." (2012: 419) drawing attention also to the 
methodological bias of policy mobility scholarship which is "... fixated on policy presences, 
following what has already arrived and formed” (2012: 418). Clarke (2012) taking a 
distinctive historical approach, similarly makes a considered and thoughtful call for 
scholarship on policy mobility to be attentive to the wider dynamics of policy change and 
decision making, including an absence of policy flows.  Drawing on the work of the urban 
historian Saunier, Clarke’s criticism of policy mobility scholarship is also methodological. 
He argues that the ‘flow’ methodology advocated by policy scholars both encourages 
attention towards successful policies, as well as restricts exploration of the wider context 
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surrounding these flows, whereas Saunier’s "… [historical] starting point brings into focus 
the full breadth of attempts to mobilize urban policy, some of which succeed while others 
fail. This breadth of view is lacking in studies of contemporary urban policy mobility which 
‘follow the [successfully mobilized] policy’ using ‘flow methodologies’ (Peck and Theodore, 
2010a)” (Clarke 2012: 39). These tensions or ‘dualisms’ between presence and absence, 
success and failure, and mobility/immobility have been acknowledged by McCann and Ward 
(2015: 2, emphasis added) who note that: 
"Much of the work in the urban policy mobilities approaches has, almost by definition, 
emphasized those policies that appear to be ‘mobile’, where there is evidence of the policy 
being moved from one location to another.... The ‘other’, so to speak, in the literature is the 
group of policies that do not appear to have travelled, policies that appear to exist in just one 
location."  
But, as noted, there remains a lack of clarity about what constitutes this ‘other’ of immobile 
policies: whether it be successful but unrecognised policies, or failed ones, or a mix of both, a 
point returned to below in discussion of assemblages. Further, despite the increasing 
conceptual recognition of policy failure, policy mobility scholarship has in many ways served 
to reinforce rather than challenge the empirical dominance of positive best practice cases. 
Ranging from Temenos and McCann’s (2012) case study of Whistler and its implementation 
of international ‘The Natural Step’ sustainable development program, to Ward’s  (2006) 
study of business improvement districts, the majority of empirical cases in the policy 
mobility field concern the movement of policy successes.  Peck, for example, defines 
contemporary ‘fast-policy’ regimes as:  “… characterised by the pragmatic borrowing of 
‘policies that work’… by iterative constructions of best practice” (Peck 2011: 773).  There is 
a tension, therefore, between an increasing conceptual recognition by policy mobility 
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scholars of policy failure and yet continuing empirical attention on the movement of best 
practice policies. There are, however, some important exceptions. For example, Webber’s 
research on the mobility of World Bank climate adaptation initiatives between Kiribati and 
the Solomon Islands attends to "… [the] multiple failures and stoppages… failure in project 
outcomes, failure to mobilize, failure to implement in replication sites, and, most importantly, 
failure that becomes success through iterative extraction and interpretive processes for extra-
local learning." (2015: 29).  Webber thus shows how, despite World Bank initiatives in 
Kiribati not working well (and indeed the second program ‘KAP-II’ being judged 
unsatisfactory by the World Bank’s own mid-term review process), the Kiribati program was 
nonetheless promoted as a success in several World Bank reports, and used as a model 
elsewhere. Webber stresses the importance of “Attending to the differences between what is 
mobilized in rhetoric and in practice…” (2015: 36) - hence drawing an important distinction 
between the discourses used by actors involved in the movement of policies, and the practices 
of implementation. This point is echoed by Muller (2015) in his analysis of environmental 
policy mobility using the case of the 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia. Muller 
identified in his research on Sochi the problematic and incomplete implementation of 
practices and approaches used in the previous Vancouver Winter Olympics, noting how 
“…where there is transportation, there is also immobility: certain people and things stay put, 
they escape the attempt to move them or move only partially…” (2015: 195).  But whilst the 
cases discussed by Webber and Muller are important contributions, they are not, however, at 
their core about the movement of failed policies: Webber’s climate adaptation case is about 
the movement of a policy that failed in parts, but nonetheless was discursively framed and 
travelled as a success. Muller’s case is about the import of a policy success (from the Winter 
Olympics in Vancouver) that subsequently mostly failed. What the case of the Victorian AMI 
Program, analysed below, contributes, therefore, is a detailed empirical case of the framing 
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and movement (or not) of a policy failure.  
 
The unraveling of assemblages 
The substance of policies is an interest of policy mobility scholars, who have drawn on the 
concept of assemblage to examine the diverse constitution of successful policies (see for 
example McCann 2011).  The intention of the notion of assemblage is to acknowledge both 
the wider range of actors (human and non-human) that constitute policy making, as well as 
the broader array of (non-government, non-nation state) locations in which policies are 
formulated, evolve and circulate.  An assemblage approach, as applied to the study of policy 
movement, is thus “...characterized by a concern for the actors, practices, and 
representations that affect the (re)production, adoption and travel of policies, and the best 
practice models across space and time.” (Temenos and McCann 2012: 345, emphasis added).  
As this definition demonstrates, to date the application of the concept of assemblage within 
policy mobility scholarship has been largely directed at the making and holding together of 
policy successes. Further, the interpretation of the concept of assemblage within policy 
mobilities scholarship has tended to be rather less focused on the materiality of assemblages 
compared with its application in other fields (e.g economic sociology and STS – see Callon 
2007). Instead, attention has been mostly directed at how assemblages work to draw together 
different elements of policies from disparate locales (see Allen and Cochrane 2007, McCann 
2011). It is suggested, however, that the rich heritage of STS scholarship on heterogeneous 
(human and non-human) networks - variously termed actor-networks, sociotechnical systems, 
and agencement, as well as assemblages (see Callon 1986, Law and Hassard 1999, Graham 
and Marvin 2001) - could be more fully embraced. For this wider body of work attends 
closely to the fragility, breakdown and failure of such networks: from Callon’s (1986) classic 
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case of scallop fishing in France, to examples in agriculture (Higgins and Kitto 2004), 
housing (Lovell and Smith 2010) and medicine (Singleton and Michael 1993).  A key 
concept here is that of translation – a process by which previously disparate things and people 
are brought together into a coherent network – an ‘actor-network’ – that is able to act in a 
unified way. Callon and other STS scholars have noted the amount of work involved in 
translation, as well as the ongoing effort required to sustain stability (Callon 1986, Singleton 
and Michael 1993, Murdoch 1997).  Actor-networks are inherently prone to fragmentation 
and unravelling, as Callon demonstrates in his case of scallop conservation in France, which 
is in essence a case of failure: the scallop larvae fail to thrive in new specially designed 
collector units, and they are harvested too early by the fishermen (Callon 1986). As Callon 
describes “…translation is a process, never a completed accomplishment, and it may (as in 
the empirical case considered) fail” (1986: 196).  Ideas about the tendency of sociotechnical 
networks to disintegrate have also been applied to utility infrastructures. For example, 
Graham and Marvin in their book Splintering Urbanism describe how "Infrastructure 
networks, are, in short, precarious achievements." (2001: 182).  It is thus suggested that 
casting the assemblage net slightly wider to capture this STS scholarship on the breakdown 
of sociotechnical networks helps better recognise and conceptualise the movement of policy 
failures. For, as the empirical analysis below explores, in the case of the AMI Program it is 
fragments of the original assemblage that have splintered off and been mobilised, rather than 
a coherent assemblage.  
 
4.The AMI Program: its framing as a policy failure, and its mobility 
Framing the AMI Program as a policy failure   
It is outlined above in introduction the ways in which the AMI Program did not proceed as 
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planned, including problems of cost overruns and therefore higher bills for customers, 
concerns about health and privacy, and also around the governance of the Program. In 2015 
the Victorian Auditor-General published its second highly critical report on the AMI Program 
documenting these failures (VAGO 2015); following on from 2009 report, which brought to 
light significant concerns about the AMI Program even before it started (VAGO 2009). 
Problems were also actively debated within the public domain, with extensive media 
coverage (e.g. 24 news articles on the AMI in the Melbourne based newspaper The Age in the 
period 2009-13), and a number of active non-governmental organisations and campaign 
groups formed to protest against the AMI Program, including a new political party (People 
Power Victoria 2015, SSMA 2015).   
But it is important to recognize that the context has changed over time; that shifts in the wider 
technical and political landscape have played a role in the framing of the AMI Program as a 
failure. For instance, since the decision was made in 2006 in Victoria to go ahead with the 
AMI Program there have been new innovations in digital metering technology.  The 
technological capabilities of smart meters have changed significantly, and this is partly why 
the implementation of the AMI Program was problematic, because of the degree of technical 
uncertainty and flux within the new innovative sector of digital metering. As Adrian Clark, 
Head of Smart Metering Australia at Landis+Gyr, a large international metering company, 
explained:  "… the Victorian problems emanated from decisions taken almost 10 years ago, 
and since that time the technology has ‘leapfrogged’ ” (cited in MacDonald-Smith 2015). 
Note that an attempt is being made here to temporally limit the failure as a technical one: not 
all advanced meter programs are problematic failures, but rather the type of meters available 
several years ago had limitations. 
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A key change in the political context in the State of Victoria has been the election of a new 
state government in 2010, with a shift from Labour to a Coalition (Liberal/National) 
government.  After election the new Coalition government requested a review of the AMI 
Program, raising the possibility that it would halt its implementation, or significantly alter it 
(see Victorian State Government 2015). However, the new government did decide, rather 
reluctantly, to proceed, albeit with notable modifications including introducing optional 
flexible pricing, establishing a Ministerial Advisory Council, and subsidising in-home energy 
displays (see Victorian State Government 2015). The new Energy Minister explained the 
decision as follows: 
 
“…analysis shows that if you were looking at it from a blank sheet of paper you probably 
wouldn't go down this [AMI Program] path.  There are actually more detriments to 
consumers, or costs to consumers as the result of the project as a whole, compared to the 
benefits. But we're not starting with a blank sheet of paper. We're starting with the mess 
we've inherited from the Labor government.”(Victorian Energy Minister Michael O’Brien 
2011). 
 
Thus the change in state government in 2010 was highly significant in the framing of the 
AMI Program as a policy failure – it was a political manoeuvre (Bovens and t’Hart 1996, 
Marsh and McConnell 2010).  
 
In assessing the changing context it is also important to recognise policy flows (new 
knowledge, stories, learning) from elsewhere. For of course it is not only the negative 
example of AMI Program that has been circulating in Australia, but alongside it a host of 
other examples of advanced metering policy programs from elsewhere, for Australia is 
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positioned within international policy circuits in relation to advanced or smart metering 
(Lovell 2016).  There are multiple connections and intersections between these circulating 
‘best practice’ international smart metering programmes and the AMI Program. Other policy 
examples have typically been successful best practice ones, and these have likewise had an 
important influence on the direction of policy change in Australia towards a voluntary 
competitive or market-led mode of new meter implementation. For instance, New Zealand - 
and the market-led method for implementing smart metering it adopted - was frequently cited 
by interviewees as a counterbalance to the negative case of Victoria, as one interviewee 
explained: 
 
“New Zealand is largely seen as a positive example and Victoria as a negative one.”  
(Australian State Government Manager, April 2015). 
 
Thus illustrating the benefit of analysing policy failures alongside the circulation of other 
more positive policy examples. 
 
The mobility of the AMI Program  
A key finding is that the AMI Program has indeed been mobile – it has travelled despite (or 
indeed because of) being an example of worst practice. This finding runs counter to much of 
existing scholarship, which, as discussed above – although ambiguous – mostly implies that 
policy failures do not move. Most obviously this mobility is evident at a domestic level. In a 
number of Australian state government policy documents there are explicit statements 
explaining a shift in smart metering policy away from a mandatory method of 
implementation because of the AMI Program (see Table One below). Thus, a related finding 
is that its movement has not principally been one of urban mobility – travelling city-to-city 
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within Australia – but rather a movement via state governments and the organisations 
governing the NEM. This is important because the majority of policy mobility studies to date 
concern inter-urban mobility (McFarlane 2011, Jacobs 2012, Prince 2014). The movement of 
the AMI is a finding that resonates more strongly with the political science notion of policy 
transfer, wherein policy transfer is conceptualised as taking place between governments, 
internationally and between regional states (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, Marsh and Sharman 
2009). 
 
[insert Table One about here] 
 
But there is much less evidence of the AMI travelling internationally, beyond Australia. 
Whilst empirically it is of course more difficult to account for the absence of policy 
movement, rather than its presence (McCann 2011, Jacobs 2012), a review of international 
smart grid and smart metering reports, conference programmes and websites has yielded very 
little reference to, or discussion of, the Victorian AMI Program.  Searches of policy 
documents, reports and conferences papers generated by the two main international smart 
grid networks - the International Smart Grid Action Network (ISGAN) and the Global Smart 
Grid Federation (GSGF) - reveal just two mentions since their foundation in 2010: one in a 
presentation at the 6th ISGAN International Workshop in Johannesburg, which describes the 
AMI Program as “… mandated and expensive” (AER 2015) and second within the GSGF 
2012 Annual Report, which again describes the AMI Program in negative terms: “The State 
of Victoria commenced a mandatory roll-out of smart metering infrastructure… consumer 
reaction to the project was extremely negative” (GSGF 2012: 15).  Further, the AMI Program 
did not form one of the “…two illustrative smart grid projects” profiled in the GSGF’s 
dedicated chapter on Australia, with two other more overtly successful cases instead 
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discussed: Smart Grid Smart City and Essential Energy’s Intelligent Network Communities 
Project (GSGF 2012: 16).  The European Technology Platform for Smart Grids (2005+) has 
no reference to the AMI Program in its wealth of online documents and presentation slides; 
and nor was it listed under the international projects of the main US smart grid project 
database (see Smart Grid ICH 2015).  
 
However, there is one exception internationally, which is a detailed review of the AMI 
Program undertaken by an organisation called the New Zealand (NZ) Smart Grid Forum - a 
public-private partnership of the NZ Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment and 
the NZ Electricity Networks Association (Moore 2015).  New Zealand has implemented a 
quite different market led (voluntary) method for transitioning to smart meters, and this 
appears to be the rationale for conducting the comparison with Victoria, as it is noted that 
“Both Jurisdictions have seen similar technology smart meters installed at the majority of 
electricity consumers’ premises over broadly similar timeframes” (2015: 4).  In keeping with 
other international analyses, the New Zealand report clearly positions the AMI as a policy 
failure, remarking that "The Victoria Smart Meter Program has been widely reviewed and 
criticised” (2015: 3) and also that “…the AEMC [Australian Energy Market Commission] is 
working on rule changes to enable contestable metering service, partly as a result of the 
Victoria experience” (2015: 8).  It does, however - in contrast to other international analyses - 
provide fine-grained analysis of how the AMI Program was decided upon and implemented.  
 
 
What has circulated and been mobilised? 
The AMI has predominately travelled discursively – as a story of policy failure.  There has 
not, in other words, been much transfer of details about what the program entailed, nor 
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elements that did work well (e.g. the high level of penetration of new smart meters achieved, 
at 93% (VAGO 2015: 15)) – albeit with some exceptions, for instance in the NZ Smart Grid 
Forum analysis.  So there has been mobility, but what has travelled is partial: the AMI has 
been simplified through its active construction as a story of policy failure (see Table One). A 
recognition that it is the discourse of policy failure which has had an effect in influencing the 
rest of Australia’s policy decision making is encapsulated in the comments of an interviewee 
close to the decision making processes in Victoria and the NEM: 
 
“We've now moved to the voluntary [meter] rollout model… and it's a bit of an elephant in 
the room, but it's not particularly controversial to say that it is a pretty inefficient way to 
rollout smart meters because it results in dribs and drabs of meters… and doesn't get to a 
position of saturation quickly enough to really capitalise on the benefits that smart meters 
have… The real underlying driver behind that change of reform is that no Energy Minister 
now wants to be responsible for saying, ‘We're going to do the same thing Victoria did.” 
(Sustainability Consultant, May 2015). 
 
The crafting and circulation of policy discourse and ‘storylines’ has been identified by other 
scholars working on policy transfer, learning and mobility (Robertson 1991, Bulkeley 2006, 
Clarke 2012), and draws on a rich tradition of political science and interdisciplinary 
scholarship researching the power of discourse to effect (or hinder) policy change (Hajer 
1995, Dryzek 1997, Bulkeley 2000). Clarke (2012: 31), for example, identifies a key insight 
from Saunier's work regarding rhetoric and discourse as follows: "...urban policy mobility 
was used rhetorically from the very beginning of the transnational municipal movement… 
Stories about other cities were used by politicians and municipal officers to subvert – or to 
strengthen – the local status quo." Also Marsh and McConnell (2010: 570, citing Bovens and 
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t'Hart 1996, pp10) note how “Whenever a policy fiasco is ‘discovered’, many different kinds 
of people engage in the meaning making that produces it."  But, in contrast to the circulation 
of best practice policies - which tend to be rich in detail and allow for mutation, 
experimentation and learning from them - the circulation of the story of the AMI Program as 
a policy failure appears instead to have largely closed down the possibility of learning. An 
interviewee explains in rather blunt terms that: 
 
“..the experience in Victoria has laid to waste any further views of a mandated roll-out in the 
NEM, at least within a generation.” (Electricity Market Project Officer, April 2015); 
 
whilst another state government policy officer also recognises the inhibiting effect on 
learning of the highly politicised construction of the AMI as a policy failure, suggesting, 
however, that his own state jurisdiction is perhaps more receptive to policy learning: 
 
“We feel that [our state] community is pretty mature and that we wouldn’t have some of the 
ridiculous backlash, sort of Today Tonight type backlash, that Victoria has had.  The main 
issue for us is…  that we can’t make a compelling economic business case for smart meters at 
this stage. The benefits aren’t firm enough.” (State government manager, May 2015). 
 
Further, because it has travelled discursively, the AMI program does not appear to have 
mutated - i.e. changed as it has travelled and moved elsewhere - as suggested by existing 
empirical work on (best practice) policy learning and mobility (Bulkeley 2006, Peck and 
Theodore 2010, Prince 2012). There is a notable consistency in how the AMI Program has 
been interpreted within Australia, as evidenced by the quotes in Table One above. This is 
perhaps quite simply because it has not been implemented elsewhere (and therefore altered or 
 24 
mutated in the process), because it is an example of policy failure. This immutability could be 
a more general finding shared by other instances of the movement of policy failures, although 
Illical and Harrison (2007) did find mutation over a longer timeframe, between countries.  
Indeed, looking internationally it might be that there is more scope for learning from the AMI 
Program, because there is distance from the domestic political context.  For example, the NZ 
Smart Grid Forum report on the AMI Program acknowledges the particular setting of 
decision making in Victoria: 
 
“There are different ways to mandate and run a smart meter roll out; some of the issues 
associated with the Victorian programme may not apply to other mandated programmes but 
provide a useful comparison to the issues identified with market led investments in smart 
metering in New Zealand” (Moore 2015: 12). 
 
Thereby alluding to the unique confluence of place-specific issues associated with the AMI 
Program, which are seen as potentially separate  – or able to be dissociated from – other 
mandated metering programs. In this way certain elements of the AMI Program are rendered 
immobile, in what could be conceptualized as an active, intentional fragmentation of the AMI 
Program policy assemblage. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
The arrival of a new set of ideas from geography and urban studies on policy mobility has 
productively reinvigorated existing political science scholarship on policy transfer. However, 
there remains a bias running across both sets of scholarship, namely a focus on 
internationally-mobile best practice, successful policies. Case studies of policy failure and 
their movement are rare. This paper responds to recent calls to empirically address this gap 
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(Jacobs 2012, McCann and Ward 2015), providing a detailed case study of policy failure: the 
implementation of smart or ‘advanced’ metering in the State of Victoria, Australia.  Evidence 
regarding the mobility of the AMI Program indicates: first, that policy failures can be mobile; 
and, second, that in this case of policy failure there has been relatively constrained mobility, 
with primarily domestic circulation. The international movement of policies concentrated on 
by policy mobility and transfer scholarship - focused largely on policy successes – is much 
less evident with regard to the AMI Program. 
 
The concept of policy mobility positions a range of non-state actors as closely involved in the 
making of policy and its movement. It also introduces the idea that policies change or 
‘mutate’ as they travel and are implemented, as well as bringing new conceptual insights, 
including the notion of assemblage. To date, however, assemblage has been deployed 
primarily to describe and better understand the holding together or coherence of multiple 
elements of best practice policies, drawn from different locales.  It is proposed, however, that 
greater attention to its broad usage within STS (through work on actor-networks, 
sociotechnical systems and so on) to explain instances of disintegration and breakdown is 
useful in thinking about cases of policy failure. For what is mobile in instances of policy 
failure is not a coherent ‘actor’ or heterogeneous network – designed to be replicated and 
comprising multiple integrated components (institutions, legislation, policy instruments etc) - 
but rather discursive fragments of an assemblage that has broken down.  Use of a more STS-
orientated conceptualisation of assemblage lends itself to a number of insights with regard to 
the empirical case in hand: first, that policy failure may travel differently to policy success 
because there is not a coherent assemblage (a successful policy, or ‘best practice model’) to 
mobilise in such cases; and, second, in helping us to better understand what remains 
immobile in cases of policy failure - in the case of the AMI Program the fragments that have 
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been mobilised are for the most part selective and highly politicised discursive framings of 
what went wrong, and - as noted - other more positive aspects of the original assemblage are 
left out of this story and remain immobile, such as the high installation rate, and the wealth of 
new energy data that is now being generated in Victoria.  Further, what remains immobile 
internationally may be domestic policy processes and politics specific to place of origin of 
the policy – there is tentative evidence of this in the detailed New Zealand review of the 
AMI, wherein the local particularities of the AMI Program are acknowledged, but judged to 
not necessarily apply to other mandated metering programs implemented elsewhere (Moore 
2015: 12). 
 
More broadly, an understanding of how and why the AMI has been framed as a policy failure 
and has been mobilised within Australia requires attention to shifts in the wider context, 
including a change in state government, international policy flows, and technological 
innovation. In other words, the framing of the AMI Program as a policy failure has emerged 
from, and resonated because of, changes in Australian domestic politics and policy, 
international policy, and smart metering technology since the Program was first approved in 
2006. Thus, for example, the apparently successful implementation of a voluntary market 
model for installing smart meters in New Zealand has been influential in that the existence of 
an alternative policy solution has gone some way to allow – and encourage – the explicit 
naming of the AMI Program as a failure. Detailed investigation of the empirical case has 
been important in identifying these nuances.  Whilst there are of course limitations in 
drawing wider conclusions from this single case, the findings indicate a number of issues that 
could be further explored in relation to the mobility or geographies of policy failure, 
including:  what is mobile in these cases; the context in which the policy failure is framed as 
such; and the degree to which learning from policy failures is inhibited, i.e. by the discursive 
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story of failure circulating, rather than detailed analysis of what went wrong and how it could 
be rectified. Other cases of policy failure could usefully research the extent to which these 
findings are likely to able to be generalised. In particular, the differential geographies of 
policy failure and the breakdown and fragmentation of policy assemblages are two areas 
where there is felt to be merit in further analysis, discussion and conceptual refinement, 
including through drawing further on insights from STS scholarship about the fragility and 
unravelling of sociotechnical networks. 
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